At the time, Android seemed to be on top of the world. Having emerged as a Google hobby platform in 2008, the new platform suddenly exceeded expectations of serving as an efficient software platformer in the production of new phones, replacing JavaME, various mobile Linux distributions, Windows Mobile, Symbian and other platforms which had existed before the iPhone.
A Chrome Wrench on Android Work
Just as Android began to take off among hardware manufacturers who were desperate to create something that could compete against iPhone, Google introduced a brand new operating system: the 2009 Chrome OS, which The first was aimed at netbooks. Google expected hardware manufacturers to produce the first mini-notebooks that run Chrome OS by mid-2010 – in parallel with its phone-based Android 2.0, just released in late 2009.
Google's dual OS strategy was not & # 39 ; t as opposed to Apple's Mac and IOS, or Microsoft's desktop Windows and Windows Mobile 6.x in the same period. But it did not work exactly as expected. Sena 2000's netbook requires that Google planned to capitalize on Chrome OS was eradicated by iPad in 2010. In addition, hardware manufacturers were not even ready to build Chrome OS netbooks until mid 2011.
Chromebook partners like Samsung delivered their first models Just like no one cared about netbooks anymore
By the end of 2010, Apple had sold almost 14 million iPads at around $ 500, shifting the tension in the industry from netbooks to tablets. Google scrambled to respond and ended up slowing down on Android for phones by focusing the next big 3.0 "Honeycomb" version entirely on tablets in 2011, just as Chrome OS licensed was also ready to bring the first netbooks on the market .
Steve Jobs Response to Android and Chrome OS
Both Honeycomb tablets and Chrome OS netbooks flowed out of the port. But that was not the only problem for Google's Android and Chrome OS. Both had also touched Apple, who increasingly saw Google as an attacker instead of a partner.
Steve Jobs addressed Apple employees at a Council Assembly in February 2010, saying, "Do not make any mistake, Google will kill iPhone. We will not let them go," while Google also reduces "Don't be evil" mantra, animation continued to increase between Apple and Google. The couple had previously worked together to bring Google's powerful search and mapping services to the iPhone using Apple's easy-to-use apps and development platform.
But After Google Mocket Apple on the release of Android 2.0, Apple stopped incorporating new features in Google Maps in IOS, including Google Latitude Location tracking and Google Maps + Navigation services that debuted with Android 2.0 at the end of 2009. Jobs had also announced in 2009 that Google's leader Eric Schmidt would go down from Apple's board, especially because Google came into "more of Apple's core businesses, with Android and now Chrome OS."
Google now pays Apple billion dollars every quarter to keep search traffic from Apple's platforms – but at that time, Google's leaders behaved like a rift with Apple, not a big deal. In 2011, Schmidt assured himself that within six months, mobile developers wanted to prioritize Android over iOS, delete Apple's leadership in mobile development and iOS App Store. It has not happened seven years later.
Google exaggerates its tension for Android
When its national partner became an enemy, Google's Android failed to take over iOS leadership in mobile development, but failed to spread into premium hardware markets Apple created around iPhones, the new iPad and the ever more advanced Mac offers.
Google tried to beat the iPad with 2011 bigger and more expensive Honeycomb tablets, along with newer Android phones that introduced major monitors, 4G LTE, NFC, fingerprint scanners, and other brand new features. Google also began releasing initiatives to make Android relevant to short-range Nexus Q TV boxes and in game consoles with Android TV and the now-released Nexus Player.
Google's Android 3.0 Honeycomb Tablets Was More Like PC Tablets Over Apple's iPad
When these failed, Google Android repositioned as a way to run a series of 7-inch tablets with low performance, especially Google's self-designed 2012-2013 Nexus 7 with an incredibly low price of only $ 199. After cheap tablets, fancy Android phones gave space to commodity units with collapsing prices that yielded little profit. The ideas that Android partners wanted steamroll iOS and that they could promote innovation faster than Apple became increasingly difficult to believe.
In early 2013, Android's brutal performance under the leadership of Andy Rubin resulted in Rubin being sidelined in "new projects". The Android Department was handed over to Sundar Pichai, Head of Chrome OS Development. In 2014 Rubin was completely out of Google.
Sund Pichai and the Swing Against Android
During Pichai, Google Chromecast launched in 2013 as a way to challenge Apple's popular AirPlay to wirelessly stream audio and video from iOS devices to an Apple TV. Nevertheless, Chromecast was not based on Android. Instead, it used software developed for Chrome OS.
Pichai also turned the script on Google's "cheap hardware" and finished its low-end tablets and launched Chromebook Pixel, a costly Chrome OS webbook priced at $ 1,300 to $ 1,450, with the aim of Apple's popular MacBook Air instead for its lower priced iPads.
Chromebook Pixel was neither cheap nor Android or successful
Former Chrome OS netbooks from partners, including Samsung, had been priced around $ 550. Pichai introduced Pixel by saying, "The goal was to push the border and build some premium. "
Pichai also clearly understood Chrome OS as the future of Google's hardware licensing.
"We are pushing data processing in the future," said Pichai at that time. "It will definitely make the ecosystem thoughtful. I think people will take the first step towards building tablets with this."
It did not happen. Chrome OS remains unpopular and Pixel's sales never took off.
The next year, Google flopped another Android tablet, Nexus 9, ironically, the code name "flounder". It was designed to look just like Apple's so popular iPad mini, which had run iPad sales in the stratosphere. It also has a higher price, from $ 400 to $ 480, much higher than previous Android tablets from Google and its partners.
But Apple-like prices did not result in Apple-like sales.
Nexus 9 failed to challenge Apple's iPad or result in even a small commercial success by itself. Android tablets generally began to decline, and the tablet market has become a contract since.
Google's hope that smartphone applications only scale up to a larger screen did not result in a desirable tablet platform. In contrast, Apple worked to create iPad-optimized apps and demonstrated this in the introduction of iPads, resulting in a sustainable platform and demand for iPads that could run sophisticated tablet-updated iOS apps.
Despite Google's hopes of Chrome OS, individuals and businesses did not buy it. So Google started dumping ChromeBooks at US K-12 schools, many of whom were happy to assist in distributing low cost computers of any kind. Four years later, no tide has been raised for Chromebooks aimed at individuals or businesses.
As Chromebook Pixel stagnated as a placeholder product with marginal sales, Google began to develop a more affordable new Chrome OS tablet that acted as a "removable" similar to Microsoft Surface. Shortly before the release, Google decided that Chrome OS would not work and instead launched the device at the end of 2015 as Pixel C running Android, starting with $ 500. It made for another expensive Android tablet, again linked to a platform that just could run stretched smartphone applications.
Pixel C was Google's latest Android tablet
Last year, Google released Android tablets. Last week, Google introduced three new devices: Pixel 3 phones, a home theater "smart screen" and a new Chrome OS Pixel Slate tablet. Although it is remarkable that Google again tries Chrome OS instead of Android on the latest tablet, the company also increased eyebrows by dumping Android from its desktop "hub" tablet product.
Instead of running Android or its officially approved "Android Things" platform designed specifically for running smart monitors and speakers, Google's new home theater is more like Chromecast, and re-runs software coming from Pichai & # 39; s Chrome OS layers instead of Rubin's Android.
Of the four device categories Google now sells, is still based on Android (Pixel phones), while tablets, TVs, and display products have been moved. If Chrome OS could run a phone, Google would probably have done it, but the reality is that it took Google five years to get rid of Android in tablets. Three years after it was introduced "Android Things," it is now rejected by that too.
Google is rumored to build a new "Fuchsia" platform to replace Android on phones, and everywhere it is still used. But the question is still: Why does Google Android leave as fast as possible?
Intellectual Property Issue continues to run Android
It seems that Google's shift is from a combination of Android design as an interpreted Java implementation instead of running native code, the continued problem with Oracle's intellectual property laws which involves Android's grant of Sun's Java code and Pichai's natural devotion for its own Chrome OS work instead of Rubin's Android.
Android fans can insist that the platform is not inherently incorrect, but the reality is that Android phones require a lot more RAM to perform as well as iOS devices, and can not continue. Android defenders can insist that Oracle has no legal rights to Android or its IP lawsuit has no advantage but the reality is that the case has nothing to do. has been thrown out and instead continues to become stronger for Oracle, threatening to involve billions of damage to Google and / or the threat of introducing new regulation or review of how Google can use Android, a far more devastating potential than just paying a ticket.
Since we first published the idea that Google was distancing from Android, the contravention has insisted that this idea was preposterous. But here we are a few years later, and Google uses non-Android software everywhere, it may: Chromecast, tablets, and monitors, despite the fact that it's Android code that it can use instead of delivering Android Things as a solution, expected the third parties to use.
Google distances itself from its "dominant" Android on phones
Android is still alienated by its fans as a "dominant" platform that broadcasts on most of the world's phones, just like Symbian did a decade ago. But among those companies that actually earn money associated with Android, the brand does not seem to be very important. It is quite almost treated as a commitment.
Back in 2013, Android's largest licensee Samsung already avoids direct mention of Android in its marketing of the Galaxy S4, focusing on Samsung's own user interface and security layer, which can be effectively transferred to alternative operating systems. At that time, Samsung had sold Bada and worked at Tizen, both of whom wanted to replace Android.
Samsung Galaxy S4 webpage made a review of Android in small type
This year, even Google seemed to go out of order to avoid saying the word "Android". Writing for 9to5Google Stephen Hall noted that "Android" was not even said under "Made by Google 2018". It's the first time ever that Google has had a public hardware event like this – since its 2008 operating system introduction – without mentioning its least-known name. "
He also noted that Google has removed" Android "from much of its app branding. Android Pay and Android Messages are now Google Pay and only Notifications.
New Android apps and actions also get a Google branding : Google One, Google Allo, Google Tasks. For its latest Pixel 3 products, Hall added that there is no mention of Android in the store box. Not even a mention on the boot screen.
If Android is so popular and popular among buyers globally, why do proprietors and even Google avoid mention it?
The answers seem to be in line with what we predicted five years ago. Android lingers under the question of stolen IP and its basic basis as a platform are not only wrong but not in accordance with Google's own core competence and the focus on its management.
G oogle has always been a web service company, building web clients with web tools. It was only with the acquisition of Rubin's Android project in 2005 that it came into business to maintain a non-web platform. Android has simply not worked well. Google has invested enormously in the platform, but as the years have passed, it has not been able to attract the type of premium users that iOS has.
Apple has free draining in a world dominated by Android
The most important thing that Android has achieved is to fill up space that has prevented other potential competitors from breaking down. When Microsoft tried to launch Windows Phone in 2010 to exploit its PC partners to touch Apple's iPhone, it was stymied by the free availability of Android.
When Samsung likewise tried to get Bada off the ground in 2010, then Tizen in 2012, it was blocked by Android lock on smartphone applications and mindshare. Keep in mind that Samsung has moved its own smartwatches and Smart TV to Tizen, making it clear that it wants Android as much as Google does.
Blackberry invested significantly in the development of Blackberry OS X, hoping that the new platform would operate tablets, phones, and other mobile devices. In a world increasingly dominated by Android, it did not have the chance to get rid of the ground. It gave up and adopted Android and has fallen into oblivion since.
Sailfish, Nokia MeeGo / Maemo / Moblin, Ubuntu Touch, and other mobile mobile platforms with open source, have also been unable to sprout and evolve under the annoying rug on Android.
The companies that have used Android without Google, the Four Fork and Distribution Distributors used in China, greatly increases legacy footprints of Android without adding much value. If anything, this use of Android only contributes to the difficulty of to replace Android with something better either from Google or from an emerging competitor.
Having the entire consumer electronics world largely targeted under the Android handset of its problems and unable to quickly and radically innovate has been good for Apple
On the other hand, the whole world of consumer electronics has largely focused on Android handcuffs with its problems and unable to quickly and radically innovate – has been good for Apple. This means that instead of to compete against Microsoft or a radical new innovator, it must only stand in front of a mobile platform that has never been directly profitable for developers and is hindered by its own inheritance and fragmentation. [1 9659003] It has given Apple a focus on optimizing iOS to work across generations of iPhones, specializing in tablet and higher PC replacements for PC notes in the form of iPad Pro, and to develop new platform categories in Apple TV and Apple Watch in a calm way.
If Google, Samsung, Microsoft or any other company could create a new platform to replace Android, they would not only face the difficult potential to break through the nasty atmosphere in the fragmented, installed base of Android. They will also compete with an established mobile and portable platform that generates tens of billion dollars a quarter, one that has unlocked the design of advanced, efficient silicon and has an extremely sophisticated development platform that generates almost all of the profits of third party developers.